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N THE SUPREME COURT
DF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-B

espondent,

vs.

( Case No.

J O H N F R A N K P A C E , and
MILTON E. H A N S E N ,
Defendants-Appellants.

'

136

°6

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Milton E. Hansen

STATEMENT OF T H E
N A T U R E OF T H E CASE
The defendant Milton E . Hansen appeals his condction for crimes of burglary in the second degree and
jrand larceny.
D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E L O W E R COURT
Defendants were convicted by a jury of the crimes
)f burglary in the second degree and grand larceny
1
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in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Joseph
G. Jeppson, Judge, Presiding. The defendant was
sentenced to serve the indeterminate term as provided
by law for the crime of burglary in the second degree.

R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L
The defendant urges the reversal of the convictions
on both counts and that the case be remanded to the
District Court with directions to dismiss the grand
larceny count and for a new trial on the burglary
charge.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about March 14, 1973 in the early hours of
the morning a burglar alarm at the Intermountain
Farmers' Association premises at 1800 South West
Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah went off causing one
Thomas Miller to telephone the police, the latter arriving on the scene at approximately 2:16 a.m. (T. 23,
24, 25). The premises consist of a yard area encircled
by a large chain link fence with angle iron and barbed
wire top strands, an office building, and a combination
store and warehouse building. (T. 9, 10, 15, 16, 40,
64, 150). At the time the police arrived, the glass in
the office door was broken. (T. 39). The defendants
were never seen inside of the building, (T. 64) but were
arrested within the fenced boundaries of the property
and near the southwest corner of the yard. (T. 42, 43).
2
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ter the arrest of the defendants, there was found in
i office building a safe on which an unsuccessful atapt to "peel" had been made and one or two footnts left by damp shoes. (T. 46, 47).
Police officers inspected the store and warehouse
rt of the premises where they saw some more damp
rtprints and puddles. (T. 48, 49). It had been snowj from approximately 12:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m. on
arch 14,1973. (T. 37).
There were also several sets of tracks in the snow
tside of the building, two sets of which led away
>m the building, over the fence, and left the area on
learby railroad track. (T. 50, 67, 70). There was a
sken window on the north side of the warehouse, (T.
), from which window a set of tracks exited. (T. 44).
A large double door on the south side of the buildy was also open at the time. (T. 57). This door was
type which had dead bolts on one side of the door
lich went into the ceiling and floor, the other door
^king with a latch and key into the bolted door. (T.
, 2 1 ) . Entry into the warehouse and store building
is made by kicking the south side double doors from
e outside. (T. 98, 99).
There were some saddles in the store on March 13,
>74 with a value of approximately $200.00 each. (T.
12, 123, 133). The record is not clear as to whether
not the saddles were there on the following day. (T.
57, 129). But the defendants did not have them in
eir possession when they were arrested. (T. 60).
3
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The defendants had entered the fenced area following some footprints, in search of persons whom the
defendant Hansen believed had collided with his car
sometime earlier, (T. 192, 193) walked around the
building, (T. 192), noticed that the window had been
broken and that the warehouse door was open, (T. 192),
picked up some items that were in a pile near the open
door, (T. 176, 199) and were arrested by police, (T.
179). The defendants did not enter the building or take
any property. (T. 179).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E COURT A B U S E D ITS D I S C R E T I O N
I N F A I L I N G TO G R A N T T H E D E F E N D A N T
HANSEN'S MOTION FOR A SEVERANCE
P R I O R TO T H E T R I A L .
On the day of trial and after the jury had been
impaneled, the defendant Hansen moved for a severence asserting that he would be prejudiced if tried
jointly with the defendant Pace. (T. 3, 4). The question of whether or not a severance will be granted is
within the discretion of the trial court. Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-31-6 (1953), This court has not heretofore delineated all of the reasons for which a severance can be
granted under the referenced statute, but the State of
California has a similar provision, Cal. Penal Code
§
1098 (West 1970), and that court has set out the
grounds for a severance under such a statute. People

4
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. Massie, 66 Cal.2d 899, 428 P.2d 869 (1967). The
California Court in discussing this statute found that
mong other reasons, when the defendants have conlicting defenses or there exists the possibility that the
o-defendant would give exonerating testimony, a sevrance should be granted.
During the trial the defendant Pace did not testify
nd offered no evidence of any kind in his behalf. In
nstructing the jury, the court told them not to conider Pace's silence nor to draw any inferences against
dm from it. (R. 267). The court made no comment
is to whether the silence of Pace could be considered in
weighing the testimony of the defendant Hansen. There
exists a good possibility that the jury inferred Hansen's
estimony to be suspect because Pace, although present
it the trial, did not confirm it. If the jury so considered
Pace's silence against Hansen, he was prejudiced there>y. Thus, the defendant Hansen was not only presented from obtaining possibly exonerating testimony
Torn Pace because Pace was tried jointly with him
md could not be called to confirm Hansen's testimony,
)ut he was burdened with the possibly inculpating silence of Pace.
The defendant Hansen offered a defense while the
lefendant Pace made no defense at all. A situation
tvhere there was a greater inconsistency in the defenses
?ould hardly be imagined short of that where each
accuses the other of the crime. In refusing to grant
Hansen's motion to sever, the court forced him to trial
jointly with a defendant whose defense was inconstent
5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

with his own and whose silence likely was used against
him. Further, the court made no attempt to prevent
the jury from drawing improper inferences from the
predicament of Hansen in being tried jointly with Pace.
I t cannot be said that Hansen was not prejudiced by
the court's refusal to exercise its discretion in this regard. Therefore, the convictions should be reversed.
POINT II
T H E COURT E R R E D IN A L L O W I N G
T H E J U R Y TO H E A R A N D C O N S I D E R
TESTIMONY W H I C H WAS INADMISSIBLE
BECAUSE IT WAS,
A. E V I D E N C E O F A N O T H E R C R I M E .
B. E V I D E N C E O F I N S T R U M E N T S , T H E
POSSESSION OF W H I C H WAS INFLAMMATORY BUT W H I C H INSTRUMENTS W E R E
NOT
CONNECTED
TO
THE
CRIMES
CHARGED.
At the trial, one officer Williams was called by the
State and gave testimony over defense counsel's objection that he had searched the defendant Hansen in
the jail subsequent to his arrest and found among
clothing items a glass cutter and a lock pick. (T. 110,
111). The court asked the officer to spell "lock pick"
and that was done. (T. 111). The officer went on to
describe the lock pick and then related how such an
item can be used to open a door for which one did not
have the key. (T. I l l , 112). The defendant asserts
6
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at the admission of this testimony was reversible error
lich this court should notice despite counsel's failure
give the right reasons for his objections thereto at
e trial. State v. Poe, 21 Utah2d 113, 441 P.2d 512
968). Clearly the testimony was offered to show
at the defendant Hansen was in possession of burgr's tools which is a crime in this State, Utah Code
nn. § 76-5-205 (1953). Therefore, the offering of this
stimony was evidence of another distinct separate
ime than the one charged. The law is clear that evidLce of crimes other than the one charged is inadmissle. State v. Cox, 74 Utah 149, 277 P . 972 (1929);
tate v. Anselmo, 46 Utah 137, 148 P . 1071 (1915).
; is apparent from the testimony offered and the
ngthy explanation of the use of a lock pick that the
tate offered this evidence primarily for the purpose
?
creating in the minds of the jurors the impression
tat the defendant had a propensity to commit crime
id thus committed this one because he carried burglary
>ols. The offering of such testimony for that purpose
as been unequivocally condemned by decisions of this
)urt. State v. Johnson, 25 Utah2d 160, 478 P.2d 491
1970) ; State v. Dickson, 12 Utah2d 8, 361 P.2d 412
1961) ; State v. Anselmo, supra. In both the Johnson
ad Dickson cases the court held evidence of other
rimes was not admissible to disgrace the defendant as
person of evil character with the propensity to comlit crime. In Anselmo, this court noted that only the
rime charged can be shown, any other which the deendant may have contemplated or committed being irelevant. The court further said,
7
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"If other actual offenses may not be shown, then
it must follow that facts and circumstances from
which some might deduce an inference that those
who have offended might possibly be induced to
commit more offenses can likewise not be shown."
46 Utah at 163.
Because this evidence had no relevancy to the crime
charged, the admission thereof is improper. Further, it
could only have had a prejudicial effect since it accuses
the defendant of another crime and because of the inflammatory and unsavory nature of the instruments.
Therefore, the reversal of the convictions is warranted.
B. T H E E V I D E N C E W A S I N A D M I S S IBLE BECAUSE T H E POSSESSION OF
T H E INSTRUMENTS IS INFLAMMATORY,
T H E R E B E I N G N O T H I N G TO CONNECT
T H E M W I T H T H E CRIME CHARGED.
There was offered no evidence to show that the
burglary was effected by the use of a lock pick or a
glass cutter. On the contrary, all of the evidence tended
to show the entry to have been made by breaking out
a window, (T. 39), and by kicking down doors, (T.
98, 99). There was no physical evidence of the use
of either of the two tools about which the objectionable
testimony was solicited. As a result, the testimony becomes totally irrelevant and inadmissible under well
settled rules. To be admissible, evidence must be used
in the furtherance of the crime. State v. Little, 87
Ariz. 295, 350 P.2d 756 (1960) (Blackjack and bicycle
chain inadmissible in prosecution for sale of narcotic);

8
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'eople v .Flanagan, 65 Cal.App.2d 371, 150 P.2d 927
1944); People v. Howard, 10 Cal.App.2d 258, 52
\ 2 d 2 8 3 (1935).
The Supreme Court of Montana has treated this
>oint in the case markedly similar to this one. State v.
HlaccUone, 136 Mont. 238, 347 P.2d 1000 (1960). In
hat case, the defendant was caught at the scene of an
ttempted burglary and there was offered in evidence
igainst him a crow bar, two screw drivers, a sledge hamner, and some canvas sacks. Although entry had not
>een made to the building, a police officer was allowed
o testify as to how he learned in police school that such
;ools can be used to rip and peel a safe. The Montana
Hourt reversed the conviction holding the admission of
;he tools and all evidence about their use to be error
vhere there was no showing that any safe was ripped
)r peeled or that the defendants ever got near a safe.
The situation is the same in the case before this court:
There simply was no use ever made of a glass cutter
JY a lock pick or any evidence tending to indicate the
use thereof.
That the evidence must be related to the commission of the offense is implicit in the Utah court's decision in State v. Crawford, 60 Utah 6, 206 P . 717
(1922). In Crawford, where it was alleged that a robbery was committed with a use of a .45 caliber revolver,
this court found that the trial court erred in admitting
into evidence .32 and .38 caliber cartridges found in the
defendant's room.
But this testimony was offered not because it was

9
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relevant but because it was inflammatory. Admittedly,
were it connected with the crime, the defendant would
have to live with all of its implications and rejudicial
inferences—but such is not the case. The State served
up this testimony about a lock pick for the sole purpose
of disparaging the defendant, of making him appear to
be of evil disposition with a predisposition for the crime
of burglary. There is no other explanation for the
offering of the subject testimony. A similar attempt
to degrade a defendant required a reversal in State v.
Anselmo, 46 Utah 137, 148 P . 1071 (1915). In that
case the defendant was charged with shooting a police
officer in an attempt to escape arrest. Sometime after
the shooting a search of the defendant's room turned up
a revolver which the defendant claimed was his father's,
a blackjack, two masks, and a pair of sneakers. This
court observed that the trial court's admission of that
evidence was error because,
"The only effect that the admission of those
articles in evidence before the jury could have
had was to convince them that the appellant must
be a bad man, or he would not have had
them
" 46 Utah at 160.
And such is the only effect that the admission of
testimony about a lock pick could have in the instant
case — magnified by the further error of letting the
police officer describe how such an instrument was used
when one did not have a key and amplified by the
court's asking the witness to "spell it." (T. 111).
The trial court erred in admitting this testimony
because there was nothing to connect it to the crime—

10
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peculiar error in the light of the court's ruling with
espect to Exhibit 17 offered by the State. Exhibit 17
j&s a hunting knife found on another defendant. The
itate urged that the knife be admitted arguing that it
ould be used as a tool. (T. 164). To that argument,
he court replied, "could be, but there is no evidence of
tse, is there?" (T. 164), and denied that exhibit. The
ailure to reject the testimony about the lock pick and
he glass cutter for which there was likewise no evidence
)f use is a reversible error. In the event that there
:xists doubt as to whether this error was prejudicial—
m unlikely event considering the testimony—this doubt
should be resolved in favor of the defendant. State v.
Lewis, 8 Utah2d 224, 332 P.2d 664 (1958). Thus the
convictions should be reversed.

POINT III

THE COURT'S FAILURE TO GRANT DEFENDANT HANSEN'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE GRAND LARCENY COUNT AT
THE CLOSE OF THE STATE'S CASE W A S
REVERSIBLE ERROR AS TO BOTH THE
BURGLARY AND THE GRAND LARCENY
COUNTS BECAUSE:
A. THERE W A S NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ALLOW THE GRAND LARCENY
COUNT TO GO TO THE JURY.
B. THE SUBMISSION OF THE GRAND
LARCENY COUNT ALLOWED THE JURY
11
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TO D R A W A N I N F E R E N C E ON A N I N F E R E N C E W H I C H IS I M P R O P E R AS A M A T T E R
OF LAW.
Counsel for the defendant Hansen moved to dismiss the grand larceny charge at the close of the State's
case which motion was denied by the court. (T. 168).
The basis for the motion was that there was not sufficient evidence of a grand larceny to warrant the jury's
consideration of that charge. I t will be noted from the
transcript that at no time did the witness Lewis testify
that saddles were missing although he did state that
saddles were present on March 13, 1973. (T. 122).
Some confusion exists as to the number of saddles
which were present on the premises on March 13, 1973.
(T. 123). On pages 122 through 140 of the transcript,
considerable discussion took place about saddles and
their value. At one point, the prosecutor asked,
6

'Well, with regard to those three saddles which
you said were missing, do you have the prices reflected in that book?" (T. 127) (emphasis
added)
The fact is that the witness Lewis did not then or
at any time testify that three saddles or any saddles
were missing. Nor did any other witness testify that
saddles were missing. I t is at once apparent from the
transcript that the prosecutor assumed that fact. I n
addition, the court erroneously assumed saddles were
missing during the trial, (T. 129), and later greatly
compounded its initial error by instructing the jury that
saddles were missing. (T. 219). At one point, the
12
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fitness Lewis testified that there was a knife lying on
bag of feed next to the saddles on the 14th day of
/larch, 1973. ( T . 124). I n later testimony ( T . 154,
.55) M r . Lewis opines that saddles "left the area"
T. 156). However, from all of this testimony it is
Lot possible to determine whether or not saddles were
tolen or even how many saddles were under discusion.
A further weakness in the grand larceny evidence
,ppears in the quality of that evidence as to the value
>f saddles. The defendant submits that there was no
adequate foundation for the value testimony; that the
witness Lewis was not competent to testify to the value
>f the same and there was absolutely no other compeent evidence as to their value.
The defendants were not found in possession of
n y saddles nor were any saddles ever marked for
dentification or offered in evidence. ( T . 157 to 164).
further, it was shown that there were no marks where
addles were thrown over the fence, ( T . 155), nor
my marks in the snow where saddles or their stirrups
rould reasonably have left the same had they been
aken. ( T . 144, 145).
W h e n in a situation such as this, the defendants
lo not have the opportunity to call their own value witlesses who could offer testimony as to the value of the
addles—they could not because there was no evidence
;o be appraised—it is especially prejudicial to the defendants to let an unqualified witness testify as to the

13
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value of saddles. The prejudice is even greater because this error is added on to the unfortunate assumption on the part of the court and the prosecutor that
the saddles were in fact taken.
Because of these weaknesses in the quality and
quantity of the evidence, the court was clearly in error
in allowing the grand larceny count to go to the jury.
Apparently the court felt so also in retrospect because
it vacated the grand larceny conviction after it imposed
the sentence on the burglary. (R. 254). Accordingly,
the grand larcency charge should not only be vacated
but reversed with directions to dismiss it.

B. THE SUBMISSION OF THE GRAND
LARCENY COUNT ALLOWED THE JURY
TO D R A W AN INFERENCE ON AN INFERENCE WHICH IS IMPROPER AS A MATTER
OF LAW.
.*^|'
Although there exists certain other evidence from
which the jury could infer that the defendants had
entered the building and that they did so with the intent
to commit larceny, it is apparent that they could also
have arrived at a guilty verdict with respect to the
burglary charge by relying on the evidence—such as it
was—of the grand larceny, as reinforced by the court's
improper comment with respect thereto. (T. 219).
Whether or not the other evidence would convince the
jury beyond a reasonable doubt cannot be determined.
I t likewise cannot be determined from this transcript
and record whether the decision of the jury rested
14
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itolly or partially on the improperly submitted grand
irceny charge. Admittedly, if the jury concluded as
ley did without considering the evidence of the grand
irceny, the verdict is proper. If they considered the
irceny evidence, the verdict is improper. The only way
o ensure that the jury did not go astray was to submit
nly the burglary charge. The premise that the burgary charge must stand or fall on the basis of competent
vidence needs no citation.
The conclusion that the defendants took the saddles
5 not a known, observed, or undisputed fact. I t is
he product of an inference. Nor is the conclusion that
he defendants were in or entered the building based
>n known facts, but it may have been drawn from the
nference that the defendants took the saddles. That
he latter more likely occurred is supported in the
Record, it appearing that the jury had deliberated for
learly two hours on both charges and then found both
charges against the defendants in only twenty-seven
ninutes after being wrongly told that the saddles were
nissing. I t is this specious inference on an inference
;ort of reasoning that is improper in law, it being "a
?
amiliar rule that one presumption or inference cannot
'est upon another mere inference or presumption . . .
[But] . . . can only rest on proven facts." State v. Potello, 40 Utah 56, 68, 119 P . 1023, 1028 (1911) (emphasis added). In the Potello case, the defendant was
found in possession of a horse claimed as the property
of another. There was at the time in effect in this State,
as there is now, a "recent possession" statute. Comp.
Law 1907 §4355; Utah Code Ann. §76-6-402 (1953).
15
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The State proved that the horse was missing but not
that it was the subject of the larceny, there being no
evidence that it was stolen but merely that it had strayed
to the range. The court stated,
"the State seeks to draw the inference that the
horse strayed to the range some six or eight miles
from the defendant's place, and that someone
there took and drove him away; and, since the
horse was found in the defendant's possession,
the further inference is sought that the defendant
took and drove . . . the horse from the range.
But this is merely resting an inference or a presumption upon an inference or a presumption."
40 Utah at 69.
The court reversed the conviction of Potello holding
that where the State fails to prove the larceny and
shows only an inference thereof, it cannot then rely on
a statute to further infer that the party in possession
committed the larceny.
Clearly, the Potello decision prohibits that which
the jury may well have done in the instant case: Drawn
an inference from another inference not from proven
facts. Admitting for purposes of argument only that
the theft of the saddles was proven, the conclusion announced by the jury that the defendants committed
that theft is an inference. Reason and the record tend
to indicate that the jury then inferred that the defendants had entered the building relying on the inference
that the defendants stole the saddles for that conclusion. Because the possibility exists that this may have
occurred, the burglary conviction should be reversed
16
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ad remanded for a new trial and the grand larceny
barge reversed with instructions to dismiss it.
P O I N T IV
MISCONDUCT O F T H E J U R Y D E P R I V ED T H E D E F E N D A N T O F H I S R I G H T TO
:RIAL B Y JURY, TO CONFRONT W I T JESSES AGAINST H I M , AND TO CROSSSXAMINE W I T N E S S E S AGAINST H I M .
After the jury had retired to deliberate, two witLesses were called on behalf of the defense for the pur>ose of showing that certain of the jurors had failed to
emain awake and perceptive during the course of the
rial. (T. 206). Counsel for the defendant Hansen had
noved for a mistrial on the day prior when the sleeping
lad first been called to his attention. (T. 96). The
»ourt noted at the time that "juror No. 7, Yvonne
5undel was sleeping." (T. 96), but did not observe
;hat she missed anything, so therefore, denied the moion. (T. 96). One of the witnesses called after the
jury had retired, noticed only one juror exhibiting signs
}f sleeping, while the other noticed two jurors doing
50. (T. 210, 211, 212). The witnesses observed jurors
rub their eyes, close their eyes, let their heads droop
iown and then jerk them to an upright position again,
and otherwise comport themselves as dozing or being
near sleep. (T. 209, 211, 212, 213). This conduct went
on in the case of juror No. 7 for an hour to an hour
and one-half, (T. 209), and with respect to the other
juror for an hour or two. (T. 213). After this evidence
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was presented, counsel for the defendant Hansen again
moved for a mistrial which motion was denied (T. 217).
Under the Constitution of Utah, certain fundamental precepts are established and guaranteed to defendants in a criminal prosecution. Among these are
a right to a jury trial, a right to confront witnesses,
and a right to cross-examine them. Utah Const, art. I,
§12. What the Constitution commands is that these
rights be provided absolutely before the basic right to
a fair and impartial trial has been satisfied. If a defendant is restricted in the exercise of any of these
rights, he cannot have had that fundamental fairness
which is an inextricable part of the American process.
Inherent in the right to a jury trial is the premise that
the jury will listen to the evidence. Obviously, if they
are asleep, or so near sleep that their sensory processes
are not functioning, they cannot do so. If the jury
does not hear the evidence, the rights of the defendant
to cross-examine, to be confronted by the witnesses
against him, and to have a jury determine the evidence
are not afforded him.
When courts discuss the question of jurors sleeping, it is lumped into the category of juror misconduct,
the remedy for which is a new trial. However, most of
the cases on this point find that there was no prejudice
to the defendant or in fact no misconduct. See State
V. Jones, 187 Kan. 496, 357 P.2d 760 (1960); Hall v.
State, 223 Md. 158, 162 A.2d 751 (1960); State v.
Mellor, 73 Utah 104, 272 P . 635 (1928).
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The Utah standards with respect to misconduct
*e set out in State v. Morgan, 23 Utah 212, 64 P . 356
L901). In Morgan the court said,
"misconduct by one or more of the jury which
might have been prejudicial to the accused, raises
the presumption, especially in a capital case, that
the accused has been prejudiced thereby and vitiates the verdict unless the prosecution shows beyond reasonable doubt that the prisoner has received no injury by reason thereof." 23 Utah at
226.
In the instant case, it cannot be argued that the
ozing of at least two jurors was not misconduct so as
o raise the requirement that the prosecution show the
bsence of prejudice to the defendant. The record reeals that the prosecution showed nothing with respect
o this question, nor did the trial court's conclusions
orrect the defect. The court should have inquired of
he jurors whether or not they missed any of the testiaony. This the court did not do and as a result the
resumption that the defendant was prejudiced remains
o require a reversal of the conviction.
POINT V
T H E COURT E R R E D IN F U R T H E R INSTRUCTING T H E J U R Y W I T H R E S P E C T
TO T H E L A W O F C I R C U M S T A N T I A L E V I D ENCE A F T E R T H E I R D E L I B E R A T I O N S
HAD BEGUN BECAUSE:
A. T H E I N S T R U C T I O N W A S N O T
WRITING
19
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B. T H E I N S T R U C T I O N W A S A N INCORR E C T S T A T E M E N T O F T H E L A W CONCERNING T H E USE OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE
C. T H E I N S T R U C T I O N W A S A N I M P R O P E R C O M M E N T ON T H E E V I D E N C E ,
ASSUMED FACTS, AND CONFUSED AND
MISLED THE JURY
The jury retired initially at 4:34 p.m. (T. 206)
and deliberated until 6:25 p.m. when they returned with
some questions about the quality and quantity of the
grand larceny evidence. (T. 217, 218). The foreman
stated, "Our question is: What is evidence, considered
evidence, in regard to missing items? That is, items
that are reportedly missing but not recovered?" (T.
218). At this point defense counsel requested a conference at the bench which request it appears was not
acted on. The court then asked if the jury had any
other questions and the foreman expanded on the nature
of the jury's problem stating,
" I t has been stated that three saddles were removed. Our question is, to what extent must the
State prove, that is, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that these saddles were taken. In other words,
would a statement by Intermountain the following morning that these saddles were missing
upon searching the premises, and can we assume
then that that was part of the same affair the
night before? Or must the State have some other
way of proving that these saddles are involved?"
( T . 218, 219).
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To this question the court made the following reply:
"This is circumstantial evidence. Nobody saw
the saddles go out. And you may consider all of
the evidence surrounding the event, that they
were there the day before, and they weren't there
the next morning, and the time involved and any
people who might have been around, and determine from that whether they were taken and if
so who took them. You may consider that as
some evidence on the subject. Any other questions." (T. 219) (emphasis added).
The jury returned for further deliberations at 6:32
p.m. (R. 248). After the jury had retired again the
court observed that jurors usually have two or three
questions and noted, " I thought this one was rather
simple, so I didn't bother to wait and send a written
instruction on it." (T. 220).
Counsel properly objected to the court's so dealing with the jury. (T. 221). The jury returned at
6:57 p.m. with guilty verdicts on all counts and against
both defendants. (T. 222).
The colloquy between the court and the jury set
out above was fraught with errors, any one of which
require a reversal of the convictions. The court's answer
to the jury's question was an instruction. The court
found it to be one, but so simple as not to require
writing. The court is in error in believing that it can
give an oral instruction. It cannot. State v. Aikers,
87 Utah 507, 51 P.2d 1052 (1935), Kunz v. Nelson,
94 Utah 185, 76 P.2d 577 (1938). Instructions to
Utah juries must be in writing unless counsel stipulate
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to waive this requirement. Utah R. Civ. P . 51. This
rules applies as well to instructions in criminal matters
by virtue of the command of Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-1
(5) (1953).
This provision of the law obtains to require counsel
and the court to take the time prior to instructing the
jury to prepare the correct statement of law on the
points reasonably raised by the evidence. I t contemplates that opposing counsel, in conjunction with the
court, will draft clear, understandable, fair, necessary,
and proper instructions—instructions that will not unduly emphasize the position or evidence of either side
and will accurately and appropriately state the law with
respect to the evidence offered. The requirement of
written instructions is designed to obviate the giving of
a prejudicial instruction which assumes facts and is an
improper comment on the evidence as occurred in the
instant case. So fundamental and so vital is the right
to proper instructions that even a failure to object to
the improper giving of the same will not impinge on
the rights of defendants. This court can notice these
errors absent an objection in the trial court as is stated
in Rule 51 and as has been stated by this court. State
V. Waid, 92 Utah 297, 67 P.2d 647 (1937). Clearly
then, the instruction phase of a trial demands and is
afforded the utmost in protection against impropriety.
I t is axiomatic that the trial court cannot and must not
deprive a defendant of his right to written instructions.
When the jury indicated their confusion, the court
should have granted counsel's request to approach the
22
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nch. This request was made no doubt out of a desire
have an opportunity to draft a proper instruction to
I the jury in its handling of this circumstantial evidce. The court did not allow said conference. Rather,
Ld in violation of the statute and rules requiring that
ey be written, and absent a waiver of this requireent by counsel, the court instructed orally. It is subitted that this procedure is improper and requires a
versal and would have been so, even had the instruct s been substantially correct . . . which they clearly
ere not.
B. T H E I N S T R U C T I O N W A S A N INCORE C T S T A T E M E N T O F T H E L A W CONERNING T H E USE OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL
VIDENCE.
This court has examined the characteristics of inructions with respect to circumstantial evidence on a
umber of occasions. See State v. Laub, 102 Utah 402,
n P.2d 805 (1942), State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365,
20 P.2d 285 (1941); State v. Judd, 74 Utah 398, 279
. 953 (1929). It has required that when evidence of
circumstantial nature is presented to the jury it must
i accompanied with an instruction telling the jury how
) use the same. State v. Burch, 100 Utah 414, 115
.2d 911 (1941). Basically, the instruction should in>rm the jury of the requirement that circumstantial
ridence exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than
le guilt of the defendant. State v. Hutchings, 30 Utah
19, 84 P . 893 (1906). In Hutching<s the defendant
as charged with the offense of stealing one hundred
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sixteen chickens. There was evidence that the chickens
were not in the chicken house and the door thereto was
open. The chickens were not found. There was evidence that a fire had consumed some buildings attached
to the chicken house on the night of the alleged theft.
Further, it was shown that the defendant was observed
a few blocks from the site of the alleged larceny going
toward and returning from the area of the chicken house
at the time of the fire. The defendant was not observed by these witnesses to have been in possession of
the chickens and he denied taking them. The court
observed that several reasonable hypotheses existed
other than that of the defendant's guilt. Among them
were that the chickens were consumed in the fire or
merely ran off. The court further observed that the
defendant could not have had one hundred sixteen
chickens when seen by the witnesses or the witnesses
would have noticed it. The court held that an acquittal
was incumbent if the evidence could be so reconciled and
reversed the conviction because the instruction given
did not properly allow the jury the latitude to so construe the circumstantial evidence.
The defendant submits that had the jury been
properly instructed in the instant case they may well
have found some of the evidence to be inconsistent with
his guilt and thereby acquitted him. The defendant
stated that he was within the fenced area of Intermountain Farmers' Ass'n. because he was following the tracks
which he found exiting from a car which he believed
had collided with his car earlier in the morning. H e did
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lot have any saddles with him and it is conceivable that
these certain persons whom the defendant was following
rould have committed the burglary and larceny and
made off with the saddles. On the other hand, it may
be that the witness who testified about the saddles was
not sufficiently sure of whether or not the saddles were
in fact missing to convince the jury, had proper instructions on that point been given.
The defendant submits that rather than giving the
oral instruction which it gave, the court should have
given—at the time the confusion became apparent—the
following instruction from State v. Merritt, 67 Utah
325, 247 P . 497 (1926).
"The state must not only convince you beyond a
reasonable doubt that the alleged facts and circumstances are true, but they must be such facts
and circumstances as are incompatible, upon any
reasonable hypothesis, with the innocence of the
accused and incapable of explanation upon any
reasonable hypothesis other than that of the guilt
of the accused." 67 Utah at 338.
Although words similar to these were given to the
jury in instruction number 13 (R.272), the jury apparently did not understand that this applied to circumstantial evidence and it is not clear from the instruction
that it does. If the court intended the instruction so to
apply, it gave an inconsistent, contradictory, and confusing instruction in the giving of the oral one. When
the instructions given are inconsistent or confusing, a
reversal is warranted. State v. Thompson, 31 Utah 228,
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87 P . 709 (1906). The questions by the jury foreman
indicated sufficient uncertainty on the part of the jury
to make mandatory the giving of the above instruction.
Had such been given and the jury understood that the
quality and the quantity of the evidence with which
they were concerned — and were clearly unconvinced
by — must be such as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than guilt, they may have decided the
point differently. The defendant urges this court reverse both convictions because of the improper oral instruction and because of these further observations
about the same which make it objectionable.
C. T H E I N S T R U C T I O N W A S A N I M P R O P E R C O M M E N T ON T H E E V I D E N C E ,
ASSUMED FACTS, AND CONFUSED AND
MISLED THE JURY
This court has interpreted Utah Const, art. I, § 12
to guarantee that a jury be the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the facts and to prevent a court
from commenting on the evidence. State v. Harris, 1
Utah2d 182, 264 P.2d 284 (1953). Trial courts are
also prohibited from making any remark which might
indicate the court's attitude toward the quality or credibility of the evidence or that might imply the court
favors the claims or positions of either party. State v.
Sanders, 27 Utah2d 354, 496 P.2d 270 (1972); State
V. Gleason, 86 Utah 26, 40 P.2d 222 (1935). To do so
intrudes upon that exclusive province of the jury, although it is possible to make observations about the
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tnesses without making comments on the evidence.
ate v. Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 94 P.2d 414 (1939).
The evil to be avoided by preventing a comment
the evidence is the probability that the jury will
consciously relinquish their fact finding function to
3 court if they are aware of the court's opinion on a
fen point. This court examined the problem in State
Seymour, 49 Utah 285, 163 P . 789 (1917). In that
se, the defendant had been convicted of obtaining
mey by false pretenses. The State had alleged that
e of the false representations was about on-going
ctory construction. In one of its instructions with
spect to that fact, the trial court said, "which he [the
fendant] then and there stated was in the course of
nstruction and the same was near its completion."
I. at 293, 163 P . at 792 . In finding that to be an
lproper comment on the evidence and reversible error,
is court stated,
"Courts, in charging jurors should be very careful not to assume any material fact or facts.
Jurors, who are laymen, are always eager to follow the opinion or judgment of the court, and if
the court assumes any material fact in the charge,
the jurors are most likely to follow the assumptions of the court. Indeed, we must assume that
such is the case unless the record clearly shows
the contrary." 49 Utah at 293-294.
'his court further reasoned that since there existed
ridence from which the jury could have found the demdant not guilty, the comment was prejudicial. In
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telling the jury in the instant case that they could consider the fact that the saddles "were there the day before and they weren't there the next morning" (T.
219), the trial judge commented on the evidence thereby committing the same error as did the trial judge in
Seymour. Whether or not there were saddles on the
premises on March 13, 1973 was a fact to be determined
by the jury. Whether or not they weren't there on
March 14, 1973 was likewise a fact to be determined
by the jury. The court further erred in telling the
jury in the next sentence that they could "consider
that as some evidence on the subject" (T. 219). I t
is not clear whether in telling the jury to "consider
that" the court is referring to its preceding comments
or the testimony given. But certainly the jury could
reasonably have believed that his statement about the
saddles could be considered as evidence.
The mandate to refrain from commenting on the
evidence predominates even when the defendant does
not take the stand and the evidence is not otherwise
controverted. State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P.2d
177 (1931). In Green, the defendant did not take the
stand or admit anything although there was in evidence
his confession made prior to the trial. The trial court
gave an instruction that assumed the fact that there
had been a killing. Although other evidence would
amply bear out this conclusion, this court held it to be
an improper comment on the evidence stating,
"In this jurisdiction the trial judge is not permitted to comment on the evidence, much less
28
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may he indicate to the jury that some material
facts, not admitted at the trial, are established
beyond controversy. It is the sole and exclusive
province of the jury to determine the facts in all
criminal cases, whether the evidence offered by
the state is weak or strong, is in conflict or is not
controverted." 78 Utah at 589-590. (emphasis
added).
xi reversing the conviction in Green, this court cited
md amplified State v. Seymour, supra.
Not only should the trial court not assume facts
>r comment on the evidence, but it should avoid any
itatement that indicates to the jury what weight the
evidence has. State v. Greene, 33 Utah 497, 94 P . 987
(1908). In that case, an adultery prosecution, the court
lad observed that a man should not be allowed to colabit with a woman, hold himself out to his neighbors
is married, and otherwise make it appear that they
were husband and wife and then because the State canlot produce a witness to the marriage or a marriage
license, go "scot free". This court reversed the conviction saying that although the comments were not so
intended, they were prejudicial as an expression of
the court's opinion as to the weight of the evidence and
therefore, improper.
In State V. Harris, 1 Utah2d 182, 264 P.2d 284
(1953), a situation very near that in the instant case
was presented to this court. In Harris the defendant
was convicted of driving under the influence of intoxicants. A subsequent trial was had to determine whether
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he had previously been convicted of the same offense.
The State offered the court records of Layton City to
show that the defendant had been so convicted. The
jurors questioned the sufficiency of the court records
to discharge the State's burden with respect to a prior
conviction. In referring to the record of the prior conviction offered by the State a juror asked, "we can
accept this as concrete evidence?" The judge replied:
'You can. If you accept that, it becomes your
duty to answer the verdict a certain way. If not,
you answer the other way. If you think Mr.
Pederson has perjured himself, answer it the
other way'." 1 Utah2d at 184.
This court reversed holding the foregoing remarks by
the trial judge to be an improper comment citing the
reasoning of Mr. Justice Elias Hansen in State v.
Green.
I n the four cases briefed above, Seymour, Greene,
Green, and Harris, this court has propounded this rule:
A trial court must not comment on the evidence. In
doing so it runs the risk of assuming facts, indicating
its opinion as to the weight of the evidence, and giving
contradictory or confusing instructions. This invades
the province of the jury and causes prejudice to the
defendant which the Supreme Court will have to rectify
with a reversal. The message could not be any clearer.
Lest the State maintain the defendant was not
prejudiced by the trial court's comment about the
saddles, the defendant submits the following observa30
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is. The jury was unsatisfied with the quality and
quantity of the evidence with respect to the saddles
stated by their foreman.
" I think the reason why we are confused is, it is
very easy to look at material things in front of
you and then try to consider things that were
never recovered and never offered in evidence,
and because we weren't seeing them, we didnt
feel we were given evidence. . . " (T. 219) (emphasis added)
The jury deliberated only a mere 27 minutes after
i court had given the instruction complained of. Durj this period they held four separate votes, counted
5 results, and executed four verdicts. Not much time
is left for deliberation which makes inescapable this
delusion: The court's comments decided the matter
r them—told them the saddles had been taken and
•ongly inferred that the defendants had done the taky. As a consequence the defendant urges the reversal
his conviction.

CONCLUION
The defendant Hansen has herein set out five disict areas wherein the trial court erred. Any one of
ese errors standing alone required a reversal of his
eviction. When the errors are considered together,
>wever, the impact on the defendant's basic right to a
ir trial is devastating. Our system guarantees to each
: us a just hearing when we finally have our "day in
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court." This was denied to the defendant Hansen in
this case, and he humbly asks this court to afford him
the protection of our Constitution and our laws by reversing the conviction below and directing the court to
dismiss the grand larceny charge and grant him a new
trial on the burglary.
Respectfully submitted,
J. F R A N K L I N A L L R E D
Attorney for Appellant
Milton E . Hansen
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